

UTAH CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEMILITARIZATION DESERET CHEMICAL DEPOT

THURSDAY,
JUNE 15, 2000 - 6:00 P.M.
TOOELE CITY HALL

MINUTES

Members Present:

BAUER, Dan	State Science Advisor
BENNETT, John	SAC
BOWMAN, Jane	Western OBGYN
DOWNS, Dennis	DEQ
GRIFFITH, Gary	Tooele County
HOLT, Rosemary	Women Concerned
HULLINGER, Sid	Tooele County
KIM, Deborah	U o U Hospital
OSTLER, Dave	SAC
SILCOX, Dr. Geoff	U of U

Guests Present:

BARCLAY, Don	CAMDS
BIRDSONG, Lindsay	Citizen
BITTNER, Chris	DEQ
BRAUNERSRITHER, Chad	Citizen
CALDWELL, Monte	PMCD
CAMPBELL, Craig	TOCDF
CARD, Royden	Citizen
CLINE, Russell	Citizen
COLBURN, James	EG&G
COSTANZO, Peter	Citizen
COSTANZO, Jeri	DCD
DAVIS, Pete	PMCD
DeBIRK, Rob	Citizen
DUFFIELD, Tom	EG&G
ELKINGTON, Tonya	Citizen
ENTZ, Ron	EG&G
ERNSTROM, Paula	CEM
GRAY, Martin	DEQ
GRENIER, Roger H.	TOCDF

GROENEWOLD, Jason	F.A.I.R.
HINTZE, Marx	Citizen
HOGAN, Jeff	Citizen
HOLT, Reed L.	OME
JOHNSON, Darrell	Citizwn
JOHNSON, Patty	EG&G
JOHNSON, Susanna	Sec. CAC
KING, Cindy	Utah Sierra Club
KURKJY, Tom	EG&G
LAMB, Lorrie	Citizen
LEE, Myron	Tooele Co. Emergency
LEES, M	Citizen
LeMONS, Kerry	EG&G
MADDOX, Jack	EG&G
MESESAN, Mark	EG&G
MONTIJO, Doris	EG&G
MONTIJO, John	EG&G
NIX, Flora	Batelle
NORTON, Carrie	Citizen
OLIVER, Harold	DCD
OWENS, Doug	Parsons, Behle & Latimer
PACHECO, Dave	Citizen
PELTON, John	Citizen
RASMUSSEN, Kaylynn	EG&G
ROBERTS, Charlie	Tooele Mayor
ROSBOROUGH, Alex	Citizen
ROSBOROUGH, Andrea	Citizen
ROWE, Mike	EG&G
SAGERS, Kari	Tooele Co. Emergency
SNELL, Dick	EG&G
SNOW, John	Citizen
SNOW, Kris	Batelle

STROMBERG, Joyce Citizen
TAYLOR, Nadine CEM
WALLACE, John TOCDF
WALTERS, Clara GOPB
WAMPLER, Cami Citizen
WARBY, Clint PMCD

WARCHOL, Glen SL Tribune
WARD, Chip F.A.I.R.
WARD, Linda Citizen
WIDMEYER, Marjorie EG&G
WINTERS, C. Scott Citizen

INTRODUCTION/MINUTES - Dan Bauer

Chairman Bauer welcomed all of those in attendance tonight. He thanked Tooele City for the use of their new Council Chambers. A motion was made and seconded to approve the May 18, 2000 minutes as written. The motion carried. Jason Groenewold asked that his question to Col. Pate regarding phone logs be included in the minutes.

The F.A.I.R Resolution was taken off of the agenda. It will be presented at a later date.

STOCKPILE REPORT - Harold Oliver

Mr. Oliver, whose was filling in for Col. Pate, began by thanking the CAC for holding their meeting in Tooele. He said that since the last meeting in May there have been two leaking munitions identified. The first was a GB projectile that had been packed and shipped to TOCDF for destruction. It was later found to have a vapor leak. It is still in the container waiting for destruction but the leaking has stopped. The other leak was a liquid leak from a mustard projectile. They estimated it was a two teaspoons leak. The projectile has been put in an overpack container and put in isolated storage to await destruction.

Mr. Oliver said that since 1968 they have had bulk containers of mustard stored in the open at DCD. Because of the amount of destruction of the other munitions at DCD they now have space to begin to move the mustard bulk containers inside the earth covered structures. That operation has started.

Mr. Oliver stated that he has reviewed the communications with Tooele County since the May 8th incident. They have since had 12 Tooele County alarm notifications since then. Four of those were confirmed agent readings - three of those dealing with the liquid leaking projectile. At another igloo they are detecting agent but have not yet found the source. The other alarms came from the projectile that was shipped to TOCDF. All of these alarms were in a controlled area. The county was notified and were appraised of the all of the actions that were taking place. These calls were made within the required time line.

Mr. Oliver showed the CAC a chart of the corrective actions that have taken place at the Emergency Operations Center since May 8th. (attachment 1)

Questions

Rosemary Holt: I would like to ask about a letter that came from James Bacon and the possibility of burning non-stockpile in the incinerator. He comments on the serious consideration given to destruction of non-stockpile materiel. But before the Army proceeds further with the development and acquisition of transportable treatment systems they want to do this interim report and a final report coming out in November. He says that we have been notified on this but the deadline for public comment is July 15th and we won't be meeting again until July 20th. I feel that we have been slighted with up todate information so that we can make informed comments by July 15th. As a member of this Commission I am disappointed that we have not had any opportunity to discuss this publicly other

than when Louise Dyson and Col. Ross were here in January. A lot of us were shocked and surprised that this law has been passed in Congress to save money and burn non-stockpile in incinerators. Way back we were all told that would not be the case. Now they are saying that Congress made me do it. They are going to have to take a look at it and it is all going to be based on our permitting process. It is something that we all need to be discussing. But we have not been informed properly and that is my problem.

Harold Oliver: I will let them know how you feel. I have only received just a little bit of a briefing, probably about as much as it says in that letter. I also suggest, since this action was by a House Subcommittee, that there might be other avenues that you could get information. They are reacting by the House Appropriations Sub-committee.

Rosemary Holt: Thank you. I did not mean to put you on the spot.

Harold Oliver: I wish could help you but I will rely your concerns.

Jason Groenewold: Could you explain in more detail about the four agent detections that were inside the ventilation control areas and what the situation was that caused those alarms?

Harold Oliver: The first was in an igloo that is filtered. We have been looking for a leaker for sometime in there and we detected it again. There were two in the CAMDS operation and one at TOCDF. I don't have the details of those with me tonight.

Jason Groenewold: Do you have any explanation of the one at TOCDF?

Harold Oliver: I do, but I don't have that information with me.

Jason Groenewold: Could you explain what you do know off of the top of your head?

Harold Oliver: It was within an operating area where you would expect agent and you have controls in place to take care of it.

Mike Rowe: It was agent detecting inside one of the On Site Containers (ONCs). We constantly monitor those for agent.

Citizen: If they burn non-stockpile in the incinerators will it delay the time table for destruction of the agent in the facility?

Harold Oliver: It is my understanding that the House Sub-committee has asked the Army to run a study to answer those kind of questions. The Army has hired Miner Tech to perform that study.

PROGRAM STATUS - Monte Caldwell

Monte Caldwell, Acting Assistant TOCDF Site Project Manager, gave an update of the status of the Chem Demil Program. He began his presentation by saying that they have destroyed over 493,000 munitions at TOCDF. That is 43% of the total munitions and is equated to 8, 836, 000 pounds of GB nerve agent destroyed.

Mr. Caldwell said that Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) has destroyed almost 400,000 munitions. That is 97% of the original munitions. They have destroyed 3,824,000 pounds of nerve and mustard agents. They are still working on their VX campaign.

Construction at the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) is 81% complete. The Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (UMCDF) is 84.3% complete. Pine Bluff Chemical Agent disposal Facility (PBCDF) construction is 15% complete. At Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ABCDF) they are still working on ground preparation for the Munitions Demil Building. At Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (NECDF) they have started pouring concrete

but it is still mainly ground preparation.

CAMDS UPDATE - Don Barclay

Don Barclay, the Director of CAMDS, said that they have a couple of customer projects that they are working on. They are in the process of characterizing the VX stockpile for the destruction process at TOCDF. They have prepared a sampling plant for that stockpile characterization and gave it to the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste. Two weeks ago CAMDS completed preparing the feed stock for the Non-Stockpile Program. They will move that to Dugway for testing of the MMD1. There are two aspects of that project. First, they removed the energetics from the mustard mortars and returned the mortars to storage at DCD. The second aspect was to remove from the mustard ton container six and a half gallons into Department of Transportation bottles. Those bottles were returned to the DCD storage area as well.

CAMDS continues to support the ACWA program. They shipped several drums of VX and GB hydrolysate that was manufactured at CAMDS to Dugway where it will be used in the ACWA 2 testing. They are also preparing one of their facilities to house and test the Solvated Electron Technology. The equipment is being installed now and they plan to start to systemize for that test in July. The second test that CAMDS is performing for ACWA is the Continuous Steam Treater system. That is the alternative technologies version of the metal parts furnace. This is where they decontaminate the dunnage so that it can be safely land filled.

Questions

Dan Bauer: What is involved in ? campaign? Are you looking for jelled agent or looking to make sure that it is all VX?

Don Barclay: The task is to form a correct characterization of the VX stockpile. We have proposed to DSHW to bring them approximately 12 containers of VX. The VX in those tons represents the VX that was manufactured at Newport and downloaded into all of the munitions. We will be collecting those samples. They come in two different pads from CAMDS. One phase of the sampling we will decontaminate or acid digest the VX below a safe level so that it can be shipped to a commercial laboratory. That laboratory will perform a record of metals and a health risk assessment metals analysis of that material. The second collection of that agent will go to the laboratory at Edgewood and they will be analyzing for VX purity and organics.

Rosemary Holt: Can we backup to the non-stockpile program. In the letter that we received from James Bacon, he discusses trying to save money and etc., he states that "before the Army proceeds further with the development and acquisition of transportable treatment systems for non-stockpile chemical materiel." Where does that leave the MMD1 and the RRS? Do you feel that could become obsolete? If that is the case how do you feel about all of the time and energy that you have put in these portable systems?

Don Barclay: I can only speculate. From CAMDS perspective we feel good about the work that we went through preparing the feed stock. I can't go into the non-stockpile objectives because I don't know them and can't represent them very well. It is my understanding that they are funded through the end of September. The MMD1 is scheduled to start testing this summer. I do not know how much of their testing they will be able to accomplish. The future beyond September relies on the assessment was performed by Miner Tech Corporation. I wouldn't even attempt to guess beyond

September.

Rosemary Holt: At this point there is a sense that they are never going to be utilized. I would think that it puts everyone in a bind, including you and all of your workers, to continue to spending the funds that have been appropriated for that and to know that it may all come to not. It is very frustrating.

Don Barclay: Our attitude is that we will perform to our best of our ability and beyond that we can't control what happens.

PLANT STATUS - Mike Rowe

Mike Rowe, President and General Manager of EG&G Defense Materials for the Operations Contractor for TOCDF, began his presentation by bringing update the current status at the facility. The plant still is in idle waiting for the completion of the investigations and then the corrective actions which will result from those investigations.

Mr. Rowe then discussed what they have concluded are the faults of the facility and the plans to correct those problems. He said that they were performing maintenance on the furnace and during the restoration from maintenance the operator that was manipulating the controls allowed the furnace to do two things. He allowed it to become over drafted - meaning that they were drawing too much air through the furnace system - which through a series of manipulations caused a flow sensor to shut down, which shut the furnace down. During the attempts to relight the afterburner - after those sequence of events - agent was drawn through the system from the exposed confinement room, through the furnace, out through the pollution abatement system and it was detected at the stack. Mr. Rowe showed the CAC a schematic of the layout of the facility. (attachment 2) He then talked about the notifications and the sequence of events that followed.(attachment 3)

Although the Army's report is not final they did find a series of three factors that caused the incident. They are the mechanical systems, operators and procedures, and management and personnel. It has been determined that it was NOT caused by negligence or an intentional act. Mr. Rowe said that this event was the result of an ACCIDENT, caused by a combination of equipment malfunction and human error.

Mr. Rowe addressed the restart plan. He said that they would go through a planned restart sequence. They anticipate that they will restart the liquid incinerators first and incinerate the spent decontamination solution. This standards for this solution is less than as less than drinking water. After that they anticipate that they will be able to start the liquid incinerators and metal parts furnace in agent operation. They will then start the deactivation furnace system.

The deactivation furnace system has a major modification undergoing right now and that is why it will take longer than the other treatment units to bring on line. There are two significant modifications that are being made to the unit. The first is a control system that is put in place that will not allow the system to induce more draft than the afterburners can destroy at temperature. In addition there is an isolation device being put in front of the afterburner and between the toxic area so that the isolation valve can be shut if the unit trips off line and loses temperature. Instead of having to restart the unit hot they will isolate the afterburner, restore the afterburner and then couple the treatment unit back to the toxic areas. Mr. Rowe added that there a lot of other issues, both procedurally and design that are underway.

When they get to the point where all of the reports have been released and the corrective actions necessary to start each treatment unit they will go through a briefing process. While that briefing process is going on they are going to go through an operational verification phase. This will be done by PMCD. When they are ready to start up there will be a press advisory. They will distribute all of the details of the restart. There will be two public availability sessions where, in detail, all of the reports will be discussed. There will be one in Tooele and one in Salt Lake City.

EG&G's local report is being finalized. The Army's report is also being finalized. EG&G's Corporate report has been transmitted to the Army. The Center for Disease Control's report should come out soon.

Mr. Rowe stated that they are very aggressively going after the modifications required for the engineer fix so that this cannot happen again.

Questions

Dan Bauer: Have the dates been set yet for the public availability sessions?

Mike Rowe: No, we have to get all of the reports and verify that all of the things are done.

Dan Bauer: We will want to have a couple of CAC members at those meetings.

Jane Bowman: Will those reports be presented by you at the next CAC meeting?

Mike Rowe: Yes, I will speak for EG&G. I am sure that the Army will want to speak for themselves.

Jane Bowman: I wonder if we could ask someone from the CDC to also come the next meeting?

Dan Bauer: We will check on that.

Rosemary Holt: This wasn't on the agenda but I feel the CAC has some unfinished business. A presentation was made to the CAC in February by Steve Jones and now we have a two inch packet of hand written memos that came out of the facility, allegedly by Steve Jones. Is this something that you are taking a look at or is there some kind of information on it that you can share with us?

Mike Rowe: We have acted on that from the beginning. My corporation, my legal counsel and investigators are investigating those memos. That investigation is still ongoing. They are doing source analysis and hand writing analysis. Again, the conclusion that I come to is that we have groups who are saying that they were written by someone and that person is saying that he didn't write them. I am not Solomon. I have to let the investigators work through it and decide where they came from. When the corporate report is done I will come back and brief the CAC on the findings.

Rosemary Holt: Thank you. It was a media event and it did come before the CAC. I feel that it is something that we just can't let pass.

If I may compliment you. I was not at the last meeting, but I did read the minutes, and you used the word accountability. I was very moved by your comments and appreciate you using that word, accountability. After reading your comments I felt much better about many of the issues that we all struggle with just because of your identifying that word and how important it is. So I think that this issue also fits into that category. I have hopes that we can all hang onto that word and use you as a role model if indeed you are able to play out that word as it appears that you plan to do.

Geoff Silcox: Could you repeat what you said about the isolation valve?

Mike Rowe: One of the concerns that came out is that we get ourselves into a configuration where the system shuts down. One of the things that we want to be able to do is ensure that the afterburner system is capable of destroying any agent that comes through the toxic areas out to that point. If it shuts down and gets cold and if you track back through the system there is no positive isolation device

all the way back into the ECR's. Between the cyclone and the furnace we are installing a duct isolation valve that we have received authorization from the state to construct. Under certain conditions when the unit was off line we would shut that valve and isolate the afterburner, restart the afterburner, bring back up the temperature where it is stable and then re-establish our own configuration back into the incinerator system.

Dave Ostler: Why don't you have it set up so that the afterburner does not automatically shut down so that you don't have to restart it?

Mike Rowe: The national fire codes also look at the explosive nature and system integrity. We have to design the unit to those codes. With no flow you do not want to be injecting fuel into a hot unit. You need to make sure that it is isolated so that you would not get an explosion.

Dave Ostler: I would just think that if kept it going, at least for the time being, until you were sure that everything else had been exhausted it might be safer. But I am not an engineer.

Mike Rowe: One of things that Mr. Silcox has asked for, that I am going to provide to the Commission, is a more detailed engineer study showing how refractory continues to destroy agent because of the heat capacity. That is why the afterburner continues to function after the flame has gone out. We have adequate engineering controls that isolate the afterburner from the toxic areas prior to getting above 1200 degrees.

Cindy King: I have three questions for you. Are you planning on using both of the liquid incinerators at the same time?

Mike Rowe: The liquid incinerators are separate treatment units. There are two of them and intend to use both of them at the same time.

Cindy King: You are going to run the deactivation furnace the same time as the metal parts furnace, is that what you are saying?

Mike Rowe: During normal operations we can run all four treatment units at one time.

Cindy King: Explain to me what public availability means.

Mike Rowe: We are going to have a session that is set up where we will have personnel available with the data and people can come in discuss one on one with the responsible parties.

Craig Campbell: There will be poster stations and also the reports will be available for the public to come in and meet with the people at each station. They will be able to discuss the report findings and the restart plan. They will run from 3 to 4 hours in the late afternoon until evening. There will be one held at the Tooele Outreach Office and one at the Department of Environmental Quality building.

Cindy King: You mentioned that there are two significant modifications for the DFS. Has that notification gone out to the public yet?

Mike Rowe: It is a class one modification.

Cindy King: You are having a class one modification on two significant modifications? You used the word significant that means a class two or class three.

Mike Rowe: They are significant to this event. The modification putting a gate valve on is a class one modification.

Jason Groenewold: We have heard through news reports that the Army has assured folks in sites like Alabama and Arkansas that this type of event would not have occurred there because of this knife blade closure system that you described. Why wasn't that system installed at TOCDF and why did it take a release before corrected action is being taken? Also, based on where you are saying this is

going to be placed - after the cyclone and between the afterburner - the cyclone still goes out to the environment. I don't see how that is preventing any agent from escaping. Another thing this seems like a very significant change. You are talking about an engineering design change and I don't see how that qualifies as a class one mod. It seems to me that the public should be allowed to comment on such a change as you are proposing.

Mike Rowe: Do you have a question?

Jason Groenewold: Could you explain how you feel that the placement of this closure valve between the cyclone and the afterburner is going to solve the problem? That still leads directly to the environment.

Mike Rowe: I don't think that is the case. If you come to the public meeting we will go over it but I am not here to discuss engineer issues with you tonight.

Jason Groenewold: It sounds to me that this process is moving forward right now and we are not being allowed to comment on it. If this is the solution to prevent this problem from occurring again we are just asking for an explanation as to why you feel that way.

Mike Rowe: When you come to the public meeting we will have all of the design drawings and all of the details that you need.

Cindy King: I would like to voice the same concern. If you are in a class permit mod you can get that approval prior to the public meeting. It is appropriate that we get that information in this public forum. The Board asks engineering questions and you answer them.

Jason Groenewold: Is this how it is going to be left? We have just had a release of nerve agent and this is a solution that is being proposed and we are not given any details.

Citizen: Could you just speak in layman's language. Is there going to be a test to make sure that this works before you start?

Mike Rowe: The answer is that any modification or adjustment prior to procedures requires a functional test. We can make that part of the public meeting. We haven't written that functional test plan because the design is not complete. But it does have to be functionally tested and it is required.

Citizen: Who are the people who are going to be giving approval to restart?

Mike Rowe: The people who do the operational verifications are engineers and system experts from the Program Management Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD) in Edgewood, Maryland.

Pete Davis: I work for PMCD. There are system experts that we have back there that are trained in the specific areas of the facility. They will come out here and verify each specific area that pertains to them.

Mike Rowe: There is one other verification. If the modification is performed at the plant a certification by an independent professional engineer is required by the state.

Kari Norton: You are suggesting a solution when we haven't heard the final report on the investigation. Shouldn't the report come out before the solution is presented and is already going through modification approval?

Mike Rowe: I agree. We cannot say that we have addressed all of the problems and have all of the solutions until we see the final reports. But we do know that there was an overdraft in that system so we can go forward with designs to correct that problem. I just touched on one of the problems. There will probably be dozens of findings and all of those have to be addressed.

Dave Pacheco: I have been following this in the news for years but this is first time that I have been

to one of these meetings. Will the public have an opportunity to provide input into the design change that you are suggesting before you actually do it?

Mike Rowe: We are going to discuss in the public outreach meetings all of the changes and modifications we do. If a modification is substantial enough that it requires public comment by the rules and regulations by the State of Utah we will go through that process.

Citizen: You still haven't found out the exact problem?

Mike Rowe: We still have to get the reports from all of the investigations to be sure that there were no other issues. But we believe the direct issue that caused the release was the overdraft of the furnace and the temperature of the afterburner.

Jason Groenewold: Will you address the first part of the question that I had. When this problem was originally identified at JACADS and the engineering changes are implemented at the other sites, why wasn't there protective measures to install this type of system at TOCDF?

Mike Rowe: We will address that question at the public availability meetings.

Jane Bowman: Just to clarify. It is possible that the plant could be up and running before this availability sessions, right?

Mike Rowe: No, we will not start agent operations until these sessions are done.

Kari Norton: I would like some confirmation that the plant will not continue to run until the investigation has been completed and the modifications have had a chance to be commented publicly.

Mike Rowe: We will not have agent operations until the public sessions are over.

Deborah Kim: Can you describe the process that you go through when you select an independent engineering group to review the changes that you are proposing.

Mike Rowe: The rules require a professional engineer from the State of the Utah to verify that the design that has been permitted through the mod is in fact installed in the facility.

(During this time there was a discussion about the classifications of modifications but they were not picked up on the tape)

Jane Bowman: Has the situation ever risen where a modification has been submitted and you decided that it wasn't appropriate and you changed the classification?

Marty Gray: I don't remember specifically if a class one has been implemented and then we had to tell them not to. I know that some modifications have been submitted as a class one but we have made a determination that they should have been a class two or higher.

DSHW UPDATE - Marty Gray

Mr. Gray talked about a class two modification that they had received quite some time ago from TOCDF. There was a public comment which ended on June 12th and they are reviewing those comments. This permit modification allows the permittee - The Army and EG&G - to ship off site rather than processing spent decontamination in the liquid furnace. It would go to a commercial facility for processing. DSHW expects to make a decision within the next week as to whether or not they will approve this modification.

Mr. Gray also talked about the Notice of Violation that was issued on April 13, 2000. There were 101 findings. The state found 39 violations but the bulk of those were self reported. These notice of violations were based upon inspections from September 1998 to September 1999. Mr. Gray offered to break down these violations at a future CAC meeting.

Mr. Gray stated that they are still looking into several different issues including Gary Harris and "Cougar" and how they effect DSHW. They are looking into the documentation as part of those issues. He said that who sent them is not a big deal. Mr. Gray added that DSHW is about through with their investigation of the May 8th incident. He said that after listening to Mike Rowe that their findings are fairly consistent with EG&G's. DSHW will issue their report soon. Dennis Downs said that when the report comes out it will be on the DSHW website.

Questions

Rosemary Holt: What and why is the purpose for shipping the spent decontamination to another site?

Marty Gray: The reason is that the spent decontamination causes a lot of corrosion to the refractory. This causes TOCDF to replace the refractory more often than they would like to. Also because of the slagging that is caused in the secondary combustion chamber from the spent decontamination solution. Because of these issues there is a lot of down time.

Rosemary Holt: Are these things surprises or had they anticipated them?

Marty Gray: Theses secondary combustion chambers of the liq were constructed with a slag rule system so that they wouldn't have to have down time to remove the slag. It has not worked as well as they had hope it would.

Rosemary Holt: Would you classify it as a major problem?

Marty Gray: From a regulatory it is not a big issue for us. There are a couple of things that we are looking for on shipping the slag off site. This is more of a cost issue.

Rosemary Holt: Is it expensive?

Mike Rowe: Yes, it is about \$2,000,000 an outage to replace the slag.

Beverly White: Where do you ship the slag?

Marty Gray: If the modification is approved there will not be much slag, it will be spent decontamination. There are number of hazardous waste incinerators around the country that have permits to process that. It could stay in state.

Dennis Downs: I would like to make a clarification. It was reported at a CAC meeting a couple of months ago that Gary Harris's attorney had declined to participate in further depositions related to court actions and appeals before the DSHW board. That decision has been reversed and there will be additional depositions later in the month. Attorneys for the Army and EG&G will be traveling to Portland for those depositions.

Rosemary Holt: Thank you for telling us rather than reading it in the newspaper.

Dan Bauer: We have a standing invitation for Mr. Harris to speak to us anytime.

Jane Bowman: You mentioned that you didn't think the "cougar" issue is a big deal. It is a big deal to the CAC. We have received testimony from several people who have reported to know who authored those documents. We need to know who we can rely on for accurate testimony.

Cindy King: On the spent contamination decon class 2 permit, wasn't that a prior permit approval?

Marty Gray: No.

Cindy King: Now that you are in the process of either approving or disapproving this permit mod I understand part of that permit mod had to deal with the issue of 5X. Isn't it true that DSHW has not approved the regulatory requirements for 5X?

Marty Gray: 5X is an Army term. We follow the waste and analysis plan and if it meets the waste and analysis plan for shipment that is how we look at it.

Cindy King: Have you or have you not approved 5X?

Marty Gray: 5X is a process that a lot of our waste and analysis determinations are based on because that is what the Army uses. Have we approved 5X, no. We have approved a waste and analysis plan that is based on a lot of the 5X data.

Cindy King: But 5X itself has not been approved by DSHW or EPA as a regulatory environmental agencies, right?

Marty King: No.

Chris Bittner: I wanted to follow up on a question last month. It was asked if anyone had been admitted to the clinic during the May stack release. We did check on that and nobody was admitted.

CITIZEN CONCERNS

To begin this portion of the meeting Charlie Roberts, the Mayor of Tooele, welcomed the CAC to Tooele and said that the Council Chambers of the City Hall is available for CAC meetings. He said that the May incident raised the level of awareness in the community. He requested that more of the CAC meetings be held in Tooele because of the close proximity of the facility to the citizens of Tooele County.

Chip Ward: I am a citizen of Tooele County. I would like to make a general comment. Dennis made a comment that I think is significant. At one point he pointed to Jason and said "that there will be an opportunity for the public to comment if that is how you define yourself." In reading the minutes of these meetings I think that Jason's role is often questioned. He is a citizen and is a representative of the public. I am the chairman of Families Against Incinerator Risk. We have 1000 members and an additional 2000 members on a mailing list because they are concerned about this issue. Realistically these are very complicated issues. Technically the engineering and chemistry are very hard to understand. Environmental law and policy are difficult to sort through. The roles here, the terms, the acronyms, the players, the rules and history of this whole thing. You can see from your discussion of the difference between a class one, class two and class three permit that these are very difficult issues to grasp. Most citizens are not going to hang in there and try to learn these things or try to participate. That is why we organize and designate someone to speak for us. Everybody does this. Such as the AARP and NRA. This is a traditional and constitutional means of people getting involved. We know that very often Jason asks tough questions and he is relentless. We support that. He reports back to our board and we direct him. We talk to him at least three or four times a week. The fact is that democracy is sometimes messy and uncomfortable but it works. I would suggest to you that if the Army had been more inclusive and open when they designed this thing thirty years ago perhaps you wouldn't be involved in such contentious situation now. The one power that you have here is that you provide a forum for people who are concerned. Any of us who have been reported on in the newspaper or sit in front of TV cameras know that they often get it wrong. This is one of the few opportunities that we have to ask these difficult questions. F.A.I.R. is the public and I want you to know that he is supported by us.

Dennis Downs: I would like to respond. If you had listened carefully, which I am sure that you did, my comment was intended to mean that Jason was not the only public represented here. There are many "Publics." He has the right to speak and we welcome his comments here. His question was in the context of would we allow the incinerator to restart until the public was satisfied. My question

to him is are you the public or are there others who are also the public? My answer to him is that we will make the best informed decision we can taking all of the comments into consideration from all of the "publics" which are out there as well as our engineering experts.

Rosemary Holt: Bev raised the question of what our responsibilities as a Commission are and what we are supposed to do. (Ms. Holt read from the Utah Citizens' Advisory Commission's Mission (attachment 4). She advised that the Commission members read it regularly.)

Jason Groenewold: Rosemary, I am glad that you brought that up because prior to coming to this meeting I read the CAC mission statement. If you sense a little frustration in some of our comments it is because the mission statement does describe this as the forum in which we ask these questions and we bring forth information. There has been a resistance at times to hear that information from our perspective. This latest incident that occurred in May is a classic example of how the Army handles dealing with the public and that is to exclude them. Here we are in a situation where something that we were told that would never happen, happened. All of the standard operating procedures that would have notified the public that a release had occurred were not followed. Then when we are asking for the actual data about the event we are told don't worry we are looking into it but we are not going to give you any of the information that we have. Now we come here tonight and find out that correct measures are being taken to prevent this from the future. Meanwhile, none of the information is being given out to the public. We are not allowed to comment on it and when we ask questions about it we are told that they won't answer it tonight.

I feel sympathy for Mr. Rowe because I don't think that he is the person that should be put in the position to answer all of these questions. The Army is in charge of this program. They are going around telling people in Oregon, Alabama and Arkansas not to worry because this won't happen in your community because we have extra safeguards in place to prevent that from occurring. Why weren't those same safeguards put in place here? What is it about us here in Utah that gives the perception to people in the country that we are out in the middle of now where.

You may have heard that the Calhoun County Commission in Alabama has called for an independent investigation and Congressional hearings into this event because they are concerned about what this means to their community. Yesterday they had eight of the top people from the Army to respond to their questions. We don't even see the top figure heads here tonight. The County Commissioners in Alabama are saying it is fine if it happens out in Tooele and it is fine if it happens out at JACADS because they don't have people there. I think that we can appreciate that we all live here and we all are effected by this site. It appears that the Army doesn't feel the same way because they haven't taken the same appropriate corrective measures to prevent the releases from occurring. Our concern is that it takes an event like this before something gets done.

I will pass out this letter so that you can look over it.(attachment 5) We are just trying to bring information before you and it is entirely up to you to decide what you want to do with it. You can advise the Governor we feel that would be great. We would ask that. If you feel that the information we present is useless then this will just go in a circular file.

We were asking the Citizens' Advisory Commission at the last meeting to make the same request of our representatives that the Calhoun County Commission has done. The feeling behind that is that we are asking the fox to investigate why hens are disappearing from the hen house. I was told to give this process a chance. Let the Army come back with their findings and let them get back to

us. That is why we decided to table the motion that we worked with Mr. Bauer to present to the other commission members because we feel that this is the forum to make recommendations to our government officials.

I am really disappointed after tonight's meeting knowing that the Army has investigated this and all of the reports are done and yet no information is going out to the public. In fact they are so confident in what they found that they are already moving forward with a corrective solution but in the same breath they are saying that they can't talk about it because they are not done. The irony and hypocrisy in that is overwhelming. What are we supposed to think as the public. Standard operating procedures were not followed, workers weren't checked for exposure and CAMDS workers were not even notified about the release when it occurred. We weren't told about the second release of nerve agent on the night. Full details of the release weren't given. Information was sent out to the press indicating that no agent had gotten out of the stack only later to be corrected by a follow up press release. All of this is occurring when the Army has knowledge of what was going on. The public is constantly being left in the dark. I think that is really unfortunate because I do believe we are affected and I do believe that we should be part of the decision making process.

I find it interesting that you would assume that we are not going to be satisfied with anything and yet you haven't even asked us what we think. That to me is a failure in the process. We have people in Tooele County, Salt Lake County, Davis County and Utah County who are very immediately impacted by this facility. We have individuals asking what kind of guarantees do we have that the system that they are going to put in place is going to be corrected? What is the answer to that? We have been asking for quite some time to conduct emission tests at this facility because they have altered the operation. They are burning full rockets which wasn't intended. It has never been tested. It was not part of the original design but the Army has resisted and now we have had a leak. We look at other facilities, like the garbage incinerator in Davis County, and each year they are required annual smoke stack tests. The hazardous waste incinerator are on bi-annual smoke stack tests. Yet with this facility, which I would say is a much greater risk factor than those, has to do only one test per agent and that is it. If we want to get our car licensed each year there are annual emission tests that are required to ensure that it can operate safely. Why don't we hold the Army to those same standards? I propose that to the Commission because I think that you are a body that can hold the Army accountable by informing other government agencies as to your opinion.

I will pass out another letter that we have sent around.(attachment 6) The general content is information that we have sent to other investigation teams, other members of our government and we are giving it to you to. Obviously, you can act how you like on it. We are looking for answers. It has been over a month. I think that the public is due some answers. We would ask that you would help us get some of those. It is entirely up to you. We do appreciate having a forum to work in. If you feel some frustration some at times it is because information is put out and nothing happens.

Thank you for taking this time. Mr. Bauer, thank you for working with us on the initial resolution. We appreciate that as well. We hope that the public will be involved in the solution to this problem and certainly before the facility starts up operation again.

Darrell Johnson: I live in Rush Valley. I probably live closer to this incinerator than anyone that I see in the room here tonight. My family settled Rush Valley. They were the first permanent settlers to live there. They came there in 1856. My family was moved off of the site where the plant now

stands. They owned the ranch that was selected as the site for storage of nerve gas. I think that was in 1940. We have lived around nerve gas and we have worked around nerve gas. Our family is in Clover and St. John and the little communities out there. We have been around this all of our lives. My father worked in Dugway for 35 years. He is 80 years old and is healthy.

I am a rancher and made my living ranching. My concern, and that of my neighbors, is the stuff that has been laying around for 60 years. There are leakers and the problems that is presenting. As citizens, who live around within six miles of that plant, we want to see that plant operational and see that stuff taken care of. I have a brother-in-law who has spent an entire career up there in a high position. I doubt that he would be in favor of something that was not safe for his family. I am not engineer but I am a citizen that lives mighty close to what is going on. We feel that the plant is being operated safe. The thing that we want to see is for that agent to be destroyed so that those leakers are not laying around.

James Colburn: I work out at the site but I am not here to represent EG&G or the Army. I have a question regarding the memos that came from the site. Could I ask that the record of this meeting be clarified regarding to that?

Dan Bauer: We got a package that was a release of information. I got it as the Science Advisor to the Governor. We distributed it to the Commission members. It contained a myriad of hand written memos.

James Colburn: Where did that come from?

Dan Bauer: It was given to us by F.A.I.R.

Kari Sagers: I found it interesting when Rosemary was reviewing through the objectives of the Advisory Commission. I heard you say that you were to evaluate, review and advise regarding the safety of incineration and transportation. I think a large component was left out of the picture and that is storage. I think that you out to be evaluating, reviewing and advising on the safety of the citizens for the storage that continues out there also. That might be something to consider adding to objectives. It is my job to look around and say what is the worse thing that can happen and to get prepared for it. By far any scenario that we can come up with has to do with storage.

Lori Lamb: I have lived in Tooele all of my life and I am near 50 years old. The munitions have been here longer than I have. I work in the storage area with the munitions. It would be great if they could video it so that you could watch what happens when only one munition leaks and it leaks down the bodies of twenty or forty munitions. It soaks the wood and all of that has to be decontaminated and cleaned up. It all becomes a contaminated waste. Then the doors are opened and the igloos have to be filtered and that stuff has to moved to other areas. The danger that we not only put ourselves in but those workers that have to work with that stuff everyday.

We live on this side of the mountain. You live in Salt Lake. Are we looking at this leaker report? Each day it is getting progressively worse. What happens when one day there are so many leakers in one igloo and it can't be filtered? We will not have a way to clean them up. Right now we have a safe way to do this. We have processed nearly one half million munitions in this facility. We have destroyed more GB chemical agent than any other facility has at their site. We have not posed a risk to the workers in the plant, to the communities or to our environment. I do work for EG&G and have been there since the project started. I am very comfortable in watching the safe way that we bring those munitions to our site than the way that they are trying to be handled in an igloo.

I think that the Army truly believed that a leak could not happen and we believed that too. But it hasn't hurt us but if we leave it there it will.

Roger Grenier: Are copies of the documents that supposedly leaked from the site available to the general public?

Dan Bauer: Yes, we will give you a copy.

John Snow: I have been told by people who work at Dugway that they exploded six, seven hundred and fifty pound bombs of agent to test disbursement. A B-29 was flown in radio active by a volunteer crew and used to check decon by spraying agent all over it. This is happening in Tooele County. Why are we so upset about 18 milligrams out of a stack?

Dan Bauer: I can't explain what happened in the past. This meeting is for information exchange and let people to talk about the subject and understand the process.

Dave Pacheco: I am concerned that two teaspoons of this stuff got out because there is a chance that it might be bigger next time. We are talking about things that kill people. That is what they were designed to do in the first place. We made a bad decision years ago to bring it here to Tooele County. That is a reason for us to be concerned. We were told that it wasn't going to happen. Accidents happen with the most dangerous weapons in the world and we have them right here in our back yard.

My grandfather herded sheep in Sanpete County and he told me, when I was a little boy, that he was sure happy that he was not out in the west desert because all of his friends and their sheep were dying. Why did they do that? Because we trusted the military to keep us safe. We put our lives in the hands of people who told us that it wouldn't happen. It did happen and it will happen again. We want solutions so that it will not happen again so that your kids and grandkids do not suffer the same sorts of things that these families did before. There are high rates of cancer in this valley. Maybe the people in this valley need another voice. I am going to start coming to these meetings and try to be that voice because I am the general public just like anybody else. I am part of F.A.I.R. but also a concerned citizen and gives me the right to come and express my opinion.

Jon Pettibone: I would like to answer some of that gentleman's fears and put it into perspective. We had an 18 milligram leak. The actual lethal dosage for GB, on the skin, is 1700 milligrams. You would have to have 1700 milligrams on your skin and not be treated before it is a lethal dose. We have had seven leaks out there, six have been in the yard. We have had leaks as large as 42,000,000 milligrams. If you are going to worry about something worry about those leaking munitions.

Kari Norton: My concern is for my family. Yes, these things need to be gotten rid of. But we know that ACWA has come out with alternatives to the incineration process. We also know that 40 million dollars was allotted for the testing and not all of the alternatives that were proposed were allowed to be tested because the Army hid 200 million dollars that was supposed to be used for the testing. I empathize with everyone here but I am scared. I don't trust the people who are in charge of this project. I wish people would open their eyes. Please tell the Governor that we need to bring in the alternative technologies.

Dave Ostler: Do we report on how much dioxin leaves the stack? When I was coming out here I saw a fire that was emitting millions of more times dioxin today than the plant does in several months time.

Dick Snell: We have performed agent trial burns on each furnace for metals, minerals, organics and specifically for dioxins and furans. What was estimated in the initial risk assessment was much, much higher than what the trial burns showed that we emit in the process of destroying chemical agents.

There have been several statements made that the Army lies to the public. We are putting together reports from the Army, EG&G, CDC and the State of Utah. The statement was made that we already have these reports but we just don't want to give them to you yet. That is not true at all. The reports are not finalized. False statements need to be substantiated.

It was decided by members of the CAC that the annual picnic meeting in Ophir will be held in August. The meeting will be held from 5:00 - 7:00 p.m.

When a member is unable to attend a meeting they sometimes have a substitute attend for them. Members of the CAC discussed whether or not that substitute would be allowed to vote. Jane Bowman made the motion to allow that substitutes be allowed to participate in the proceedings but that they are not counted towards the quorum or are allowed to vote. Dennis Downs seconded the motion. The motion carried.

Beverly White asked that at the next CAC meeting the commission discuss as to what kind of power the CAC has. If they report to the Governor how much power does that really carry? It was decided that it will be on the July agenda

A motion was made that the July meeting be held in Tooele. The motion carried. It was also decided that the meeting time would change to 6:30 p.m. - 8:30 p.m.

The meeting adjourned 8:25 p.m.